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Kuhn’s famous thesis that there is ‘no unique algorithm’ for choosing between rival 
scientific theories is analysed using the machinery of social choice theory. It is shown 
that the problem of theory choice as posed by Kuhn is formally identical to a standard 
social choice problem. This suggests that analogues of well-known results from the 
social choice literature, such as Arrow’s impossibility theorem, may apply to theory 
choice. If an analogue of Arrow’s theorem does hold for theory choice this would 
refute Kuhn’s thesis, but it would also pose a threat to the rationality of science, a 
threat that is if anything more worrying than that posed by Kuhn. Various possible 
‘escape routes’ from Arrow’s impossibility result are examined, in particular Amartya 
Sen’s idea of ‘enriching the informational basis’. It is shown that Sen’s idea can be 
applied to the problem of theory choice in science. This in turn sheds light on two 
well-known approaches to inductive inference in philosophy of science: Bayesianism 
and statistical model selection. 
 
1. Introduction 
In the Postscript to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn famously 
argued that there is ‘no neutral algorithm for theory choice’ in science. Kuhn allowed 
that scientists might have good reasons for choosing one theory over its rivals, citing 
‘accuracy, simplicity, fruitfulness and so on’ as examples of such reasons, but he 
insisted that they fall short of providing an algorithm (Kuhn 1969 p. 199). Even if two 
scientists agree on the features that a good theory should have, they will not 
necessarily be led to make the same choices, Kuhn argued, for they may weight the 
features differently. For example, the two scientists might agree that accuracy and 
simplicity are both important theoretical virtues, but disagree about their relative 
importance, and thus be led to choose different theories. Neither can be called 
irrational, Kuhn insisted, and neither was necessarily acting unscientifically.  
 The idea that there is no algorithm for theory choice met with a favourable 
response from Kuhn’s critics, even among those unsympathetic to other aspects of his 
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philosophy, and seems to be regarded as fairly uncontroversial.F
1
F In part, this is 
probably because Kuhn’s ‘no algorithm’ claim tallies well with the widely-held view 
that Carnap-style inductive logic is an impossible dream. Carnap’s aim was precisely 
to devise an algorithm for inductive reasoning—a rule that, given a set of hypotheses 
and a body of data as input, would tell us which hypothesis is best confirmed by the 
data. The perceived failure of Carnap’s project, which Kuhn himself alluded to in a 
later essayF
2
F, lent credence to his claim that there is no algorithm for theory choice. 
 My aim in this paper is to explore Kuhn’s ‘no algorithm’ thesis from a new 
angle, by drawing on some ideas from social choice theory, in particular Arrow’s 
famous impossibility theorem (Arrow 1951). Social choice theory studies the problem 
of how a society should choose between a set of ‘social alternatives’, given that the 
individuals in society may have different preferences over those alternatives. I show 
that the problem of theory choice, as described by Kuhn, is formally identically to a 
standard social choice problem. This raises an interesting possibility: using formal 
results from social choice theory, such as Arrow’s theorem, to assess Kuhn’s claim 
that there is no algorithm for theory choice. That is my primary goal in this paper; a 
secondary goal is to illustrate more generally how techniques from theoretical 
economics can be applied to problems in epistemology. 
 The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 examines and clarifies 
Kuhn’s ‘no algorithm’ argument and its philosophical consequences. Section 3 
introduces social choice theory and gives a non-technical exposition of Arrow’s 
theorem. Section 4 shows how the problem of theory choice can be cast in a social 
choice framework, and asks whether an analogue of Arrow’s theorem applies to 
theory choice. Section 5 examines possible ‘escape routes’ from Arrow’s theorem. 
Section 6 discusses the most promising escape route, namely Amartya Sen’s 
‘informational basis’ approach. Section 7 applies Sen’s approach to the problem of 
theory choice. Section 8 shows how the foregoing results shed light on two well-
known approaches to inductive inference in philosophy of science: Bayesianism, and 
statistical model selection. Section 9 draws together the pieces and concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
1 See for example the discussion in W. H. Newton-Smith 1981. 
2 In that essay Kuhn wrote ‘most philosophers of science would  I think, now regard the sort of 
algorithm which has traditionally been sought as a not quite attainable ideal’ (Kuhn 1977a, p. 328). 
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2. Kuhn’s ‘no algorithm’ argument: clarifications 
Kuhn developed his ‘no algorithm’ argument most thoroughly in a 1977 essay entitled 
‘Objectivity, Value Judgment and Theory Choice’. In that essay, he identifies five 
criteria that provide ‘the shared basis for theory choice’, namely accuracy, 
consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness (Kuhn 1977a, p. 321). These five, he 
says, are ‘the standard criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a theory’, widely agreed 
on by mainstream philosophers of science. Kuhn has no quarrel with the standard 
view that these criteria play a key role in scientific theory choice; indeed, he regards 
them as partially constitutive of what science is. However he argues, using examples 
from the history of science, that the criteria fail to uniquely determine theory choice, 
for two reasons. Firstly, the criteria are ambiguous—it may be unclear which of two 
theories is simpler, for example. In some respects Copernicus’ theory was simpler 
than Ptolemy’s, Kuhn says, but in others it was not. Secondly, there is the problem of 
how to appropriately weight the criteria, when they pull in different directions. How 
should simplicity be traded off against accuracy and scope, for example? Kuhn says 
that ‘no progress’ has been made towards solving this problem (Kuhn 1977a, p. 329).  
It is this second problem—weighting—that will be the focus of our attention 
here, so the first problem—ambiguity—will be ignored. In any case, the first problem 
arguably collapses into the second. Consider Kuhn’s own example. He says that 
Copernicus’s theory was simpler than Ptolemy’s in that it invoked more parsimonious 
mathematics, but was no simpler in that the computational labour required to predict 
planetary positions was the same for both. If this is correct, then simplicity, in this 
example, needs to be sub-divided into two criteria: mathematical parsimony and 
computational ease, neither of which is ambiguous. Of course, this raises the question 
of how the two types of simplicity should be weighted, which is more important, etc. 
But that is just an instance of the second problem. It seems, therefore, that the 
ambiguity of Kuhn’s five criteria provides no principled reason to doubt the existence 
of an algorithm for theory choice. Disambiguation can always be carried out by sub-
dividing an ambiguous criterion, though this exacerbates the weighting problem. So 
the latter is more fundamental. 
 Suppose it is true that there is no algorithm for theory choice. What follows? 
The conclusion Kuhn drew is that value judgements play an inevitable role in theory 
choice, and thus that the ideal of ‘objectivity’, as that notion was understood by 
traditional philosophers of science, is unattainable. This does not mean that theory 
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choice is irrational, Kuhn stressed, or that ‘anything goes’, but rather that the 
traditional conception of rationality is too demanding. Two scientists, on the basis of 
the same empirical evidence, could arrive at different theories without either of them 
being irrational, Kuhn argues. So the ‘no algorithm’ argument does not undermine the 
rationality of science, he thinks, but rather forces us to a more realistic conception of 
what rational theory choice is like. Whether or not we accept this, Kuhn is surely right 
that the ‘no algorithm’ argument has important epistemological consequences. 
 Importantly, when Kuhn says there is no algorithm for theory choice, he 
means that there is no unique algorithm. His point is that given the five criteria—
simplicity, accuracy, fruitfulness etc.—which all parties agree form the shared basis 
for theory choice, there are many conceivable algorithms that one could construct, and 
no obvious way of choosing between them. (Thus Kuhn talks about ‘the algorithms of 
different individuals’ in a scientific community, while insisting that there is no such 
thing as ‘the algorithm of objective choice’ (Kuhn 1977a, p. 328).) So the problem is 
that there are too many algorithms for theory choice, each perfectly acceptable, and no 
way of singling out the ‘right’ one. This is why Kuhn sometimes expresses his thesis 
by saying there is no neutral algorithm for theory choice (Kuhn 1969, p. 199). 
 My point in stressing this is that there is another, quite different thing that 
might be meant by saying there is ‘no algorithm’ for theory choice. One might mean 
that there is no acceptable algorithm at all, not that there are too many. It might be the 
case that there is no way of constructing an algorithm, based on the five criteria, 
which meets minimal standards of acceptability. But this is not Kuhn’s claim. Rather, 
he thinks that there are many acceptable algorithms, each of which weights the five 
criteria differently, and each as rationally defensible as each other. 
 Another way to capture the distinction is this. Kuhn will presumably agree that 
there are certain minimal standards which any acceptable algorithm for theory choice 
must meet. For example, if theory T1 scores higher than T2 on each of his five criteria, 
then an algorithm that selects T2 over T1 is obviously unacceptable—no rational 
scientist could use it. So these minimal standards, whatever exactly they are, enable us 
to rule out some possible algorithms for theory choice. But on Kuhn’s view, many 
algorithms will still remain—and there is no way of narrowing down the choice to a 
single one. An alternative view, however, is that no algorithms at all will remain, 
after those that fail to meet the minimal standards have been discarded. These are 
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quite different views, and are mutually incompatible, though each might be expressed 
by saying that there is ‘no algorithm’ for theory choice.  
The distinction between these two views might be thought inconsequential, for 
both imply that there is no unique algorithm for theory choice, though for different 
reasons. And if Kuhn is right that the notion of rationality of traditional philosophy of 
science presumes the existence of a unique algorithm, then there is a threat to that 
notion in either case. This may be so; but it is still surely important to know why there 
is no unique algorithm for theory choice, if there isn’t. Is it because there are many 
acceptable algorithms and no good way of choosing between them, or because there 
are no acceptable algorithms? The epistemological consequences might be similar in 
either case, but the distinction is a real one and will play an important role in what 
follows. 
 The idea that theory choice is based on multiple criteria, which may pull in 
different directions, is not unique to Kuhn’s philosophy of science. Rather, it is 
common to diverse philosophical views on how scientific inference works. For 
example, proponents of ‘inference to the best explanation’ cite multiple factors, such 
as simplicity, unifying power, and scope, which enter into the assessment of how 
good a candidate explanation is (Thagard 1978, Lipton 1990). Bayesians argue that 
the choice between rival theories depends on how well they score on two different 
criteria—prior probability and likelihood—which can conflict (Howson and Urbach 
1992, Earman 1992).F
3
F Finally, proponents of ‘statistical model selection’ argue that 
the choice between rival hypotheses again depends on two factors—fit-with-the-data 
and simplicity—which typically do pull in different directions (Forster and Sober 
1994, Forster 2001). So the issues to be discussed below have a relevance that extends 
beyond an assessment of Kuhn’s ‘no algorithm’ thesis. 
 
3. Social choice theory and Arrow’s impossibility theorem 
Social choice theory deals with the problem of aggregating individuals’ preferences, 
over a set of alternatives, into a single ‘social preference’. For example, suppose a 
given society has four alternatives: building a school, a hospital, an airport, or a 
cinema, only one of which can be chosen. Each individual in society is assumed to 
have a weak preference order over the alternatives, that is, a ranking of the 
                                                 
3 The point being that P(H1/e) > P(H2/e) if and only if P(H1).P(e/H1) > P(H2).P(e/H2). See Sect. 8 
below. 
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alternatives from best to worst, with ties permitted. Formally, a weak preference order 
is a binary relation that is transitive, reflexive and complete. The preference order of 
the i
th
 individual will be denoted Ri, so ‘xRiy’ means that the i
th
 individual weakly 
prefers alternative x to alternative y, that is, she doesn’t strictly prefer y to x. From the 
weak preference relation Ri, we can define a corresponding relation of strict 
preference Pi, and of indifference Ii.F
4
 
 Suppose that for each of the n individuals in society, we know their preference 
order over the four alternatives. We can encode all this information in a single profile, 
denoted <R1,  , Rn>, which is simply a list, or vector, of preference orders, one for 
each individual. An example of a profile is contained in Table 1 below. Given this 
information, we would then like to be able to construct a single social preference 
order R, which ranks the four alternatives in terms of how good they are ‘for society 
as a whole’.F5F On any reasonable ethical view, the social preference order should 
depend somehow on the preference orders of the individuals in society, but how 
exactly? 
 
John  1. Cinema 2. School 3. Hospital 4. Airport  
Mary  1. Hospital 2. Cinema 3. Airport 4. School  
Jane  1. School 2. Airport 3. Hospital 4. Cinema  
Peter  1.Cinema 2. Airport 3. Hospital 4. School  
 Table 1:  A Profile of Preference Orders for Four Individuals 
 
 In his seminal 1951 work, Kenneth Arrow devised a novel way to study this 
problem. Arrow’s idea was to consider a function from profiles of individual 
preference orders to a social preference order, and then ask what conditions the 
function should satisfy. I will call such a function a ‘social choice rule’.F6F The rule 
takes as input a profile of preference orders, and yields as output a single social 
preference order. In other words, given the preferences of all the members of society 
over the alternatives, the rule tells us what the social preference order should be. A 
                                                 
4 Thus xPiy iff xRiy and it is not the case that yRix, while xIiy iff xRiy and yRix 
5 A social preference order is an object of the same sort as an individual preference order, i.e. a 
transitive, reflexive, complete binary relation over the alternatives. 
6 Arrow himself used the expression ‘social welfare function’, but this is often used in another sense 
today. 
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social choice rule is thus a kind of algorithm for making social choices, based on 
information about individuals’ preferences. 
 Arrow proposed four conditions that any reasonable social choice rule should 
satisfy: unrestricted domain (U), weak Pareto (P), independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (I), and non-dictatorship (N). He then proved, remarkably, that there 
exists no social choice rule that satisfies all four conditions, so long as there are at 
least three social alternatives. That is the content of his famous ‘impossibility 
theorem’. If we agree with Arrow that all four conditions are reasonable ones, his 
result spells bad news for the possibility of making coherent social decisions.  
 Condition U says that the domain of the social choice rule is the set of all 
possible profiles. This means that whatever the preferences of the individuals in 
society, the rule must output a social preference order, that is, there is no a priori 
restriction on the preferences that individuals are allowed to have. In many 
applications of Arrow’s framework, this condition is extremely natural. For example, 
if the ‘alternatives’ are candidates in an election, then condition U says that voters can 
rank the candidates however they like, and the rule must still output a social 
preference, that is, an election result. This is obviously reasonable. In other 
applications, restricting the domain of the social choice rule may make sense; for 
example, if the alternatives are different ways of dividing up society’s resources, then 
the assumption that individuals prefer more to less, ceteris paribus, suggests a natural 
domain restriction. But in general, condition U is well-motivated. 
 Condition P—weak Pareto—says that if all individuals in society strictly 
prefer alternative x to y, then society should also prefer x to y, that is, the social 
preference order must rank x above y. This seems indisputable: if everyone would 
rather have a cinema to a swimming-pool, then ‘cinema’ should obviously be higher 
than ‘swimming pool’ in the social ranking. This captures the intuitive idea that social 
choices must reflect what the members of society want; so if they all want the same 
thing, that is what should be chosen. 
 Condition N—non-dictatorship—says that there cannot be an individual who 
is such that whenever he or she strictly prefers alternative x to y, so does society. Such 
an individual would be a dictator—their preferences would automatically over-ride 
those of all other members of society. The existence of a dictator is clearly 
undesirable, as it conflicts with basic democratic ideals. So condition N seems 
unexceptionable. 
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 Condition I—independence of irrelevant alternatives—is at the crux of 
Arrow’s argument, and is slightly trickier than the others. It says that the social choice 
between alternatives x and y can only depend on individuals’ preferences between x 
and y—not on their preferences over other alternatives. More precisely, consider two 
profiles of individual preference orders <R1,  , Rn>  and <R1,  , Rn>, such that for 
every individual i, xRiy if and only if xRiy, that is, each individual’s preference for x 
over y is the same in the two profiles. Condition I then says that the social choice rule, 
when applied to both profiles, must yield the same social preference for x over y, that 
is, xRy if and only if xRy. Any differences between the two profiles are irrelevant to 
the social choice between x and y, according to condition I, since the two profiles are 
identical in the only respect that matters. 
 The intuitive force of condition I can be seen by considering an election in 
which voters must rank three candidates, Labour, Tory and Liberal, in order of 
preference. Various different ways of aggregating the individual preferences into a 
single social preference are conceivable. Condition I imposes a requirement on 
acceptable aggregation schemes—it says that the social preference between the 
Labour and Tory candidates, for example, can depend only on the individuals’ 
preferences between Labour and Tory. This is highly intuitive— in order to determine 
whether the Labour or Tory candidate is socially preferable, surely the individuals’ 
preferences involving the Liberal candidate should not matter? If you know of each 
individual whether they prefer the Labour to the Tory candidate (or are indifferent), 
then you know everything that is relevant to determining the social choice between 
these two candidates, according to condition I. 
Arrow wrote that his four conditions ‘taken together, express the doctrines of 
citizens’ sovereignty and rationality in a very general form’ (Arrow 1951, p. 31).  
Condition I is in fact somewhat controversial, as discussed below, but nonetheless, 
Arrow’s four conditions arguably represent quite reasonable constraints on a social 
choice rule. But remarkably, Arrow proved that all four cannot be simultaneously 
satisfied, so long as there are at least three alternatives; equivalently, any social choice 
rule that satisfies conditions U, I, and P must be a dictatorship of one individual.  
Arrow could have expressed his impossibility result by saying that there is ‘no 
algorithm’ for social choice that meets certain reasonable conditions. This way of 
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expressing Arrow’s theorem immediately suggests a comparison with Kuhn’s views 
on theory choice, to which I now turn. 
 
4. Theory choice cast as a social choice problem 
The problem of theory choice, as formulated by Kuhn, hinges on the fact that there 
are multiple desiderata that we want our theories to satisfy—simplicity, accuracy, 
scope etc. A theory that scores well on one desideratum might score badly on another, 
hence the weighting problem that Kuhn discusses. This problem may seem quite 
different to the social choice problem as formulated by Arrow, but in fact the two 
share a common structure. The key to seeing this is to regard each criterion of theory 
choice as an ‘individual’, with their own ‘preference order’ over the alternative 
theories. This may sound odd, but can be easily explained. 
Take for example simplicity. Let us assume that simplicity can be defined 
reasonably precisely, enough to permit pair-wise comparisons between the theories 
that we wish to choose between.F
7
F Then, we can define a binary relation ‘is at least as 
simple as’, on the set of alternative theories, which will be a weak ordering, that is, 
reflexive, transitive, and complete. Let us do the same for accuracy, scope, and the 
other Kuhnian criteria. From a formal point of view, each criterion is then analogous 
to an individual in Arrow’s set-up. Just as each individual rank-orders the social 
alternatives, according to how much they like them, so each criterion rank-orders the 
alternative theories, according to how well they satisfy it. So each of Kuhn’s criteria 
corresponds to an individual in Arrow’s framework, and the alternative theories 
correspond to the social alternatives. 
 It might be objected that for some criteria of theory choice, the binary relation 
will not be complete. Take for example scope. Plausibly, one might take a theory’s 
‘scope’ to be its total set of logical consequences, and the relation ‘T1 has at least as 
much scope as T2’ to mean that T2’s consequence class is a subset of T1’s. But this 
relation, though reflexive and transitive, need not be complete, for the consequence 
classes of a pair of theories may be non-nested, that is, the theories may be non-
comparable for scope. Though this is a valid point, ‘scope’ is arguably the only one of 
Kuhn’s five criteria that it affects. (In the case of simplicity, for example, it is 
plausible that for any two theories, either one is simpler than the other or they are 
                                                 
7 This assumption is not unproblematic, but the problems it raises are orthogonal to those under 
discussion here. 
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equally simple, i.e. ‘is at least as simple as’ is complete.) So the completeness 
assumption can be justified as a reasonable idealization. After all the assumption that 
individuals’ preference relations are complete is also an idealization.F8 
 The next step is to consider a ‘theory choice rule’, defined by direct analogy 
with an Arrovian social choice rule. Given a profile of weak orders, one for each 
criterion of theory choice, a theory choice rule yields a single ordering of the 
alternative theories. So for example, suppose we have four alternative theories, and 
three criteria: simplicity, accuracy and scope. By assumption, we know how to rank-
order the theories by each criterion. We feed this information into the theory choice 
rule, which then outputs an ‘overall’ ranking of the theories, from best to worst. 
Formally, the theory choice rule is defined in exactly the same way as Arrow’s social 
choice rule. 
 Next, let us ask whether Arrow’s four conditions apply to the theory choice 
rule. Condition U (unrestricted domain) seems unexceptionable—however the 
theories are ranked by the various criteria, the rule must be able to yield an overall 
ranking. There should be no a priori restriction on the permissible rankings that are 
fed into the rule. Such a restriction might make sense if there is an intrinsic trade-off 
(or correlation) between two of the criteria. For example, if greater simplicity always 
involves a sacrifice of accuracy, then the simplicity rank-ordering will be the inverse 
of the accuracy rank-ordering. This will rule out some possible inputs to the rule, 
which implies a natural domain restriction. But unless we have specific reason to 
think such trade-offs must always obtain, condition U seems reasonable. 
  Condition P (weak Pareto) seems undeniable. If theory T1 does better than 
theory T2 by each of Kuhn’s criteria, that is, it is simpler and more accurate and more 
fruitful etc., then it must surely be preferred overall. This seems as obvious as its 
analogue for social choice. What about condition N (non-dictatorship)? It says that 
there is no one criterion such that if T1 is ranked above T2 by that criterion, then T1 is 
                                                 
8 There is in fact a technical trick to get around the problem. Suppose R is reflexive and transitive but 
incomplete. We can then extend R to a complete relation R*, by stipulating that for any two objects x 
and y that are not related by R, xI*y, i.e. neither xR*y nor yR*x. The relation R* will then be reflexive 
and complete, but non-transitive; however, it will be quasi-transitive (which means that P*, the 
corresponding strict preference relation, is transitive, but I* is not) (Sen 1969). Arrow’s theorem will 
then apply; for the theorem does not in fact require that the individual preference orders be fully 
transitive – quasi-transitivity is enough. (By contrast, the full transitivity of the social preference order 




automatically above T2 in the overall ranking. This condition makes good sense, so 
long as we agree that all the criteria are relevant to theory choice. Violation of the 
condition would mean that one criterion, for example simplicity, was regarded as so 
important that a less simple theory would never be preferred to a more simple one, 
however highly it scored on the other criteria. 
 What about condition I (independence of irrelevant alternatives)? It says that 
the overall ranking of T1 and T2 should depend only on how the criteria rank T1 and 
T2, not on how they rank other theories. So for example, suppose we have three 
criteria, simplicity, accuracy and scope, and two theories. Suppose T1 is simpler than 
T2, T2 is more accurate than T1, and T1 has greater scope than T2. Condition I says 
that this is all the information that is relevant to the overall ranking of T1 versus T2; so 
if in this case the theory choice rule ranks T1 above T2 (for example), then it must 
rank T1 above T2 in every relevantly similar case, that is, every case where T1 is 
simpler than T2, T2 more accurate than T1, and T1 greater in scope than T2. As with 
the social choice rule, this condition has strong intuitive appeal, capturing the idea 
that rational theory choice shouldn’t depend on irrelevant factors.  
 If we agree that U, P, N and I are conditions on reasonable theory choice, then 
it is obvious that an Arrovian impossibility result applies. So long as there are at least 
three alternative theories, there exists no theory choice rule that satisfies all four 
conditions. This spells bad news for the possibility of making ‘rational’ theory 
choices.  
One might naturally express this impossibility result by saying that there can 
be ‘no algorithm’ for rational theory choice. This sounds similar to what Kuhn said, 
but recall the discussion of section 2. As we saw, Kuhn meant that there is no unique 
algorithm; he argued that the multiple criteria for theory choice could be combined 
into a decision rule in many ways, and there is no good way of choosing between 
them. So the problem according to Kuhn is that there are too many algorithms. But the 
Arrow impossibility result implies the opposite—there is no algorithm for theory 
choice that meets reasonable conditions. When Kuhn saw an embarrassment of riches, 
Arrow tells us that there is nothing at all. 
 Both Kuhn’s view and the Arrow-inspired view imply, obviously, that there is 
no single algorithm for theory choice, over three or more alternatives, which is 
rationally acceptable. This conclusion conflicts with the traditional ideal of rationality, 
associated with Carnap, according to which two rational agents with the same ‘total 
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evidence’ must end up in the same epistemic state. In the context of theory choice, the 
Carnapian ideal implies that if two scientists agree on what the relevant criteria are, 
and agree about how well each theory performs on each criterion, then they should 
agree on how to rank the theories. On Kuhn’s view, such agreement is unattainable—
the two scientists may weigh the criteria using different algorithms, and there is no 
saying which is rationally correct. On the Arrovian view, agreement is also 
unattainable, but for a very different reason, namely that no algorithm meets minimal 
standards of rationality. 
 Despite both implying that the traditional ideal of rationality cannot be met, 
the Kuhnian and Arrovian views are diametrically opposed. Moreover, it makes a big 
difference which is right. If Kuhn is right that the problem is too many algorithms, 
two options suggest themselves. First, we might seek further conditions that any 
acceptable algorithm must satisfy, to narrow down the pool. Second, we might try to 
liberalize the notion of rationality, and argue that two scientists could both count as 
rational despite employing different algorithms for theory choice.F
9
F But if the Arrovian 
view is right, then neither of these options holds any promise, and our epistemological 
predicament is correspondingly more serious. Put differently, Kuhn makes rational 
theory choice look difficult, at least if we cleave to a certain conception of rationality, 
but Arrow makes it look outright impossible. 
 
5. Possible escape routes 
Since the Arrow-style impossibility result threatens the rationality of theory choice, 
and thus of science, it would be nice if there were a way out. Various possibilities 
suggest themselves. One is simply that many real cases of theory choice are binary, 
that is, involve just two alternatives. It is striking that Kuhn’s own examples tend to 
be binary—geocentrism versus heliocentrism, oxygen versus phlogiston, relativity 
versus classical mechanics. And of course Arrow’s impossibility result only holds if 
there are three or more alternatives. With just two alternatives to choose between, 
                                                 
9 This idea was common in the post-Kuhn literature; see for example McMullin 1993. It is suggested 
by certain remarks of Kuhn himself, in the Postscript to Structure of Scientific Revolutions, where he 
says that his aim is not to show the irrationality of science, but rather to arrive at a more realistic view 
of what scientific rationality involves. 
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numerous algorithms become possible that satisfy conditions U, P, I and N.F
10
F Does 
this reconcile Kuhn with Arrow? 
 I think the answer is ‘no’, though it is certainly interesting that the distinction 
between binary and non-binary choice becomes significant, once theory  
choice is formulated in the social choice framework. (By contrast, on most standard 
philosophical approaches to theory choice, such as Bayesianism, it is of no particular 
relevance whether the choice is binary or not.) Not all theory choice in science is 
binary, even if the large-scale paradigm shifts that Kuhn is interested in typically are. 
More mundane cases are often not. Think for example of climate change science, 
where researchers compare the merits of numerous models of climate change, not just 
two. More generally, in many branches of science a typical problem might involve 
choosing between three candidate explanations of an observed correlation between 
two variables x and y: (i) x causes y; (ii) y causes x; (iii) x and y are joint effects of a 
common cause. Or consider statistical estimation, where a researcher might want to 
estimate the value of a real-valued parameter in the unit interval; the alternatives that 
must be chosen between are uncountably many. So focusing exclusively on binary 
choice, as a way of trying to avoid the Arrovian predicament, is at odds with scientific 
practice. 
 Another possibility for reconciling Arrow with Kuhn is simply to reject one or 
more of Arrow’s conditions. Kuhn was sceptical (in some moods) about the existence 
of ‘trans-paradigmatic’ criteria of rationality, which are universally binding on 
scientists across all eras; perhaps he would argue that an acceptable algorithm for 
rational theory choice need not respect Arrow’s conditions? This option does not 
seem especially plausible, given the intuitiveness of those conditions, but one possible 
argument against condition N (non-dictatorship) is worth briefly discussing. 
 In the context of theory choice, condition N says that no criterion can be a 
dictator, that is, can be such that whenever x ranks above y by that criterion, then x 
ranks above y overall. However, a strong empiricist might well hold that the criterion 
of ‘fit-with-the-data’ should be a dictator. Empiricists in philosophy of science have 
long argued that criteria such as simplicity are of lesser importance than fit-with-the-
data, and should only be invoked, if at all, where the data cannot decide between two 
                                                 
10 For example, ‘majority rule’, which says that alternative x is preferred to y just if it is ranked higher 
by more individuals (or criteria) is one such algorithm. With three or more alternatives, majority rule 
may lead the social preference to be intransitive, so does not even meet the definition of a social choice 
rule. 
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theories. Similarly, in a discussion of Kuhn’s five criteria of theory choice, McMullin 
1993 argued that ‘accuracy’ held a special role, for it is an end in itself while the 
others are only valuable in so far as they are reliable indicators of accuracy. So from 
an empiricist perspective, not all of Kuhn’s criteria are equal. 
 Importantly, dictatorship of ‘accuracy’ (or ‘fit-with-the-data’) need not mean 
that the other criteria play no role at all in theory choice. For recall the definition of a 
dictator: a criterion (or individual) whose strict preference for x over y always leads x 
to be ranked higher than y overall. By contrast, a strong dictator is a criterion (or 
individual) whose preference for x over y, strict or weak, always becomes the overall 
preference. A strong dictatorship of ‘fit with the data’ would be an extreme form of 
empiricism—that refused to invoke extra-empirical criteria of theory choice even to 
break ties between pairs of theories that fit the data equally well. But an ordinary (not 
strong) dictatorship of ‘fit with the data’ could use criteria such as simplicity to break 
ties, that is, to settle cases where the dictator is indifferent. This is known as a ‘serial’ 
or ‘lexicographic’ dictatorship, and represents a more moderate form of empiricism.  
 Accepting a serial dictatorship of ‘fit with the data’ is in principle a way out of 
the impossibility result, since this theory choice rule does satisfy conditions I, P, and 
U. However, even if one accepts the underlying empiricist motivation, there are two 
problems with this solution. Firstly, to make it work, a complete lexicographic 
hierarchy of all the criteria of theory choice must be established, that is, a 
specification of the order in which they should be applied, to break ties. If there are 
only two criteria, for example fit-with-the-data and simplicity, then this is not a 
problem, but if there are more than two, there is a problem. For it is quite unclear how 
the hierarchy should be generated. Should simplicity or scope be invoked first, when 
fit-with-the-data cannot separate a pair of theories? Secondly and more importantly, a 
dictatorship of ‘fit with the data’, even serial, seems unattractive when we take 
account of the fact that our data invariably contain ‘noise’. If our data were noise-free, 
always preferring a theory that fitted the data better would make sense. But with noisy 
data, perfect fit is not always desirable, as emphasised in the model-selection 
literature (Forster and Sober 1994). This ‘problem of over-fitting’, as it is known, 
constitutes a strong reason not to relax condition N in the manner mooted above, even 
if we are empiricists. 
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 Finally, two further possible escape routes, well-known among social choice 




The first is to 
modify the goal. Instead of trying to rank-order the alternatives, as in Arrow’s 
formulation of the problem, suppose we instead try to pick the best. More precisely, 
we seek a ‘choice function’ which tells us, for any subset of the alternatives, which is 
(or are) the best. (In the scientific case this has some plausibility, as the problem of 
theory choice is often formulated as the problem of which theory to ‘accept’.) This is 
a weaker goal than Arrow’s, since a social preference relation entails the existence of 
a choice function but not vice-versa, thus holding some promise of an escape from the 
impossibility result. However, it turns out that if the choice function is required to 
satisfy certain quite reasonable properties, then analogues of Arrow’s impossibility 
result re-emerge (Austen-Smith and Banks 1999). This escape route is thus thought 
unpromising by most social choice theorists, and seems equally unpromising as 
applied to theory choice. 
  The second option is domain restriction, i.e. dropping condition U. It is well-
known that with a restricted domain, there may exist social choice rules that satisfy 
conditions P, I, and N. For certain applications of the social choice apparatus, 
‘natural’ domain restrictions suggest themselves, though not for others. As noted in 
section 4, in the theory choice case, a natural domain restriction would apply if two of 
the criteria of theory choice exhibit an intrinsic trade-off (or correlation), for example, 
if a gain in simplicity always means a loss of accuracy. Then, certain profiles would 
be impossible, and could be legitimately excluded from the domain of the theory 
choice rule. However, that such trade-offs always exist does not seem very plausible; 
and anyway there is no guarantee that the resulting domain restriction would be of the 
right sort to alleviate the Arrovian impossibility.  
 
6. Sen’s ‘informational basis’ approach 
I turn now to what is arguably the most attractive ‘escape route’ from Arrow, namely 
Amartya Sen’s idea of using an ‘enriched informational basis’ (Sen 1970, 1977, 
                                                 
11 A third possible escape route is to relax condition I, a move defended by some authors, e.g.  
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2008), in the context of choosing allocations for an economy. However it 
seems unlikely that the rationale for relaxing I, in such contexts, transposes to the context of theory 




F Sen observes that the information Arrow uses as input to his social choice 
rule, namely a profile of individual preference orders, is quite meagre. This is for two 
reasons. Firstly, preference orders are ‘purely ordinal’—they contain no information 
about intensity of preference. If an individual prefers x to y to z, this tells us nothing 
about whether their preference for x over y is greater or less than their preference for y 
over z. Secondly, preference orders do not permit interpersonal comparisons. From a 
profile of individual preference orders, statements such as ‘in alternative x, individual 
1 is better off than individual 2’ cannot be deduced. 
 To remedy these problems, Sen suggests that we start not with a profile of 
preference orders, but rather of utility functions, one for each individual in society. An 
individual’s utility function assigns a real number to each alternative, which reflects 
how much utility that alternative would bring them. Let ui denote the utility function 
of the i
th
 individual; let <u1, , un> denote a profile of utility functions. An 
individual’s utility function is required to represent their preference order, in the 
sense that xRiy iff ui(x) ≥ ui(y), for all alternatives x and y.
 
(Recall that ‘xRiy’ means 
that individual i weakly prefers x to y.) Note that if ui represents Ri, then any 
increasing transformation of ui will also represent Ri. Thus there is a many-one 
relation between utility functions and the preference orders that they represent. 
 Next, Sen introduces the concept of a social welfare functional (SWFL). This 
is a function that takes as input a profile of utility functions, and yields as output a 
social ranking of the alternatives. A SWFL is analogous to an Arrovian social choice 
rule, in that both yield the same output; however, the former takes a profile of utility 
functions, rather than preference orders, as input. Potentially, this allows more 
information to be taken into account. 
 Analogues of Arrow’s four conditions can now be imposed on the SWFL. The 
analogue of U says that the domain of the SWFL is the set of all possible profiles of 
utility functions, that is, individuals can have whatever utility functions they please. 
The analogue of P says that if everyone gets more utility in alternative x than in y, 
then x is socially preferred to y. The analogue of N says that there can be no 
individual such that whenever they get more utility from x than y, then x is socially 
preferred to y. The analogue of I, known as ‘independence of irrelevant utilities’, says 
that the social preference between x and y must depend only on individuals’ utilities in 
                                                 
12 Sen’s approach has been further developed by numerous workers; for good overviews see Gaertner 
2006, Roemer 1997, and Bossert and Weymark 2004. 
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x and y. These conditions on the SWFL will be denoted U′, P′, I′ and N′; they are 
motivated by arguments similar to those that motivate the Arrovian originals.   
One might think that an analogue of Arrow’s impossibility result will now 
apply, that is, that no SWFL can satisfy conditions U′, P′, I′ and N′. However, this is 
not correct. Arrow’s impossibility result can be derived in Sen’s framework, but it 
requires an additional condition, capturing the fact that Arrow uses purely ordinal, 
non-interpersonally comparable information. To see how this informational 
assumption can be captured, consider a profile of utility functions <u1,  , un>. Now 
suppose each of the n individuals applies an increasing transformation to their utility 
function, yielding a new profile <v1,  , vn>. (Different individuals may apply 
different transformations.) On Arrow’s assumption, the two profiles contain exactly 
the same information – since the transformed utility functions represent the very same 
preferences. So Arrow will argue that the SWFL should yield the same social ranking 
when applied to the two profiles. This condition is called ‘invariance with respect to 
ordinal, non-comparable information’ or ONC. Arrow’s theorem can now be stated in 
Sen’s framework: for three or more social alternatives, no SWFL can satisfy 
conditions ONC, U′, P′, I′ and N′. 
If the ONC condition is imposed on the SWFL, this implies that interpersonal 
comparison of utility is deemed impossible (or meaningless). To see why, suppose 
that in profile <u1,  , un>, individual 1 gets more utility than individual 2 in a given 
alternative x, that is, u1(x) > u2(x). But this inequality is not necessarily preserved, if 
the individuals apply different positive transformations to their utility functions. So in 
the transformed profile <v1,  , vn>, it need not be true that v1(x) > v2(x). Therefore, if 
the two profiles are treated as informationally equivalent, as the ONC condition 
demands, it follows that interpersonal comparisons cannot be made.  
The natural next step is to ask what happens if the ONC condition is relaxed. 
There are two ways it can be relaxed: (i) drop the assumption that utility is purely 
ordinal; (ii) permit interpersonal comparisons. To effect (i), we restrict the 
transformations that can be applied to a given utility function; to effect (ii), we cease 
to allow individuals to choose their own transformations independently of others.
 
Let 
us take (i) first. Instead of ordinal utility, we might hold that utility is measured on a 
cardinal scale, so only positive linear transformations, of the form vi = aui + b, a>0, 
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are held to preserve information.F
13
F In effect, this means that an individual’s utility 
function contains information about the intensity of their preferences, so utility 
differences become meaningful. Alternatively, we might hold that utility is measured 
on a ratio scale, so only transformations of the form vi = aui, a>0, are held to preserve 
information. This means that the utility scale has a natural zero point, so utility ratios 
become meaningful.F
14
F Finally, we might hold that utility is measured on an absolute 
scale, that is, only the identity transformation preserves information. This means that 
actual utility numbers are meaningful.  
 Once a scale for utility has been chosen—ordinal, cardinal, ratio or absolute—
a decision about interpersonal comparability is necessary. If utility is non-
comparable, then each individual can apply a transformation (from the permissible 
class) independently of others. If utility is fully comparable, then each individual must 
apply the same transformation. Depending on the utility scale, a form of partial 
comparability may also be possible. With cardinal utility, if utility is unit comparable, 
then individuals’ positive linear transformations must all have the same slope, but can 
have different intercepts. 
 Numerous alternatives to Arrow’s ONC condition are now possible. They 
include: cardinal-scale utility with no comparability (CNC); cardinal-scale utility with 
full comparability (CFC); ratio-scale utility with full comparability (RFC); ratio-
scale utility with no comparability (RNC); and absolute-scale utility with full 
comparability (AFC). In effect, each of these conditions partitions the set of all 
profiles of utility functions into equivalence classes of ‘informationally equivalent’ 
profiles, and requires that the SWFL yield the same social ranking for all the profiles 
in a given equivalence class. ONC is the strongest condition—for the classes of 
profiles that it treats as informationally equivalent are very large, and thus the 
restriction on the SWFL considerable. By contrast, AFC is the weakest condition—it 
places each profile into a singleton class of its own, which implies no restriction on 
the SWFL. This illustrates a general moral: the richer the informational basis, that is, 
the finer the partition of the profiles into equivalence classes, the weaker the resulting 
condition on the SWFL. 
 Sen now asks: what happens if we retain the four Arrovian conditions U′, P′, 
I′ and N′, but replace ONC with a weaker condition? Can the impossibility result be 
                                                 
13 Temperature in celsius or farenheit is measured on a cardinal, or interval, scale. 
14 Length in centimetres is an example of a quantity measured on a ratio scale. 
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avoided? The answer is that impossibility can be avoided, but only if some 
interpersonal comparison is allowed. Replacing ONC with CNC, that is, moving from 
ordinal to cardinal utility, is no help on its own. The same is true of moving to ratio-
scaled utility (RNC). However, if ONC is replaced with CFC, RFC, or AFC, then 
Arrovian impossibility is avoided. There do exist social welfare functionals that 
satisfy Arrow’s four conditions, plus one of these alternatives to ONC.  
 (The case of ratio-scale non-comparability (RNC) merits further discussion, 
for a reason that will become clear. Although replacing ONC with RNC does not 
avoid Arrovian impossibility, it does do if all utilities are required to be non-negative 
(Tsui and Weymark 1997). If all utilities are non-negative, there do exist social 
welfare functionals that satisfy RNC and Arrow’s four conditions. Also, note that 
RNC, despite its name, does permit a limited sort of interpersonal utility 
comparison.F
15
F With RNC, percentage increases in utility can be meaningfully 
compared, that is, statements such as ‘in moving from alternative x to y, individual 1’s 
percentage gain is greater than individual 2’s’, are meaningful (Fishburn 1987). It is 
easy to verify that the truth-value of this statement will be unaltered, if the two 
individuals apply different ratio-scale transforms to their utility functions.) 
 Sen’s analysis raises two issues. First, how can interpersonal comparisons of 
utility be made? Second, once such comparisons are allowed, how large is the class of 
SWFLs that satisfy the Arrow conditions? Can further conditions be found that 
narrow down the permissible SWFLs to a single one? There is an extensive literature 
on both these points, but space does not permit them to be explored here.F
16
F For the 
moment, the point to note is just this. Sen’s work demonstrates clearly that Arrow’s 
impossibility result is in large part a consequence of the impoverished information he 
feeds into his social choice rule. Enriching the informational basis, while retaining 
Arrow’s four conditions—now understood as conditions on the social welfare 
functional, rather than the social choice rule—is sufficient to avoid the 
impossibility.F
17
F In short, given enough information, reasonable social choices can be 
made. 
                                                 
15 For this reason, some authors prefer the label RSM (ratio-scale measurability) for what I am calling 
RNC. 
16 On the first issue see the papers in Elster and Roemer 1991; on the latter, see Gaertner 2006, Roemer 
1997 or Bossert and Weymark 2004. 
17 In a way, Sen’s approach involves a rejection of Arrow’s condition I (independence of irrelevant 
alternatives). For Arrow’s condition I is equivalent to the conjunction of ONC and condition I′ 
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7. Theory choice: the informational basis  
Let us return to theory choice and apply the morals of the previous section. Recall that 
we defined a theory choice rule, by direct analogy with Arrow’s social choice rule, as 
a function that takes as input a profile of weak orders, one for each criterion of theory 
choice, and outputs an ‘overall ranking’ of the alternative theories. Just as Sen 
replaced Arrow’s social choice rule with a social welfare functional, so we need to 
replace our theory choice rule with a ‘theory choice functional’. So instead of starting 
with a profile of ‘preference orders’, one for each criterion of theory choice, we start 
with a profile of ‘utility functions’, that is, real-valued representations of those orders. 
In principle, this allows an enrichment of the informational basis.F
18
 
 The natural next question is: which profiles should be treated as 
informationally equivalent, that is, which invariance condition should be imposed on 
the theory choice functional? To address this question, we need to consider both 
measurement scales and ‘inter-criterion’ comparability. Let us take them in turn. For 
some criteria of theory choice, an ordinal scale might be appropriate. Kuhn’s criterion 
of ‘fruitfulness’ is an example. Conceivably, one could order a set of theories by how 
fruitful they are, but it is hard to believe that differences in fruitfulness can be 
compared; a statement such as ‘the difference in fruitfulness between T1 and T2 
exceeds the difference between T2 and T3’ hardly seems meaningful. If this is right, 
then the real-valued ‘utility’ function that represents the fruitfulness preference order 
is merely ordinal—any increasing transformation can be applied to it without loss of 
information. 
 However for other criteria of theory choice, we can go beyond ordinal 
measurement, at least in certain contexts. Take for example fit-with-the-data (or 
‘accuracy’), and suppose that the context is linear regression analysis. The usual 
measure of how well a hypothesis fits the data in linear regression is its ‘sum of 
squares’ (SOS) score.F19F The appropriate type of measurement scale for SOS scores 
depends on the dependent variable in the regression model. If for example that 
variable is length, which is a ratio-scale measurable quantity, then the SOS scores will 
                                                                                                                                            
(independence of irrelevant utilities). Retaining I′ while rejecting ONC thus abandons the letter of 
Arrow’s original independence condition, while retaining its spirit. 
18 This application of Sen’s framework to the problem of theory choice illustrates a point made by 
Kelsey 1987, namely that the functions used in an SWFL need not necessarily be interpreted as utility 
functions. 
19 The SOS of a hypothesis is the sum of the squared distance of each data point from the hypothesis’s 
prediction. 
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also be ratio-scale measurable. Therefore, the real-valued ‘utility’ function that 
represents the ‘fit-with-the-data’ preference order will be ratio-scaled, thus 
multiplication by a positive constant is the only information-preserving 
transformation. Statements such as ‘T1 fits the data three times as well as T2’ will be 
meaningful. 
To take another example of how we can often go beyond ordinal information, 
consider simplicity. In certain contexts, such as statistical model selection, the 
simplicity of a hypothesis is taken to be the number of free parameters it contains. 
Thus for example, the hypothesis ‘y = ax + b’ is simpler than ‘y = ax2 + bx + c’ 
because the former contains two free parameters, the latter three. So in this case, 
simplicity is measured on an absolute scale—the actual numbers are meaningful, so 
only the identity transformation preserves information. Similarly, in a Bayesian 
context, a prior probability distribution over a set of hypotheses is a case of absolute 
measurability—the actual numbers assigned are meaningful. So in both these cases, 
we have much more than ordinal information.   
 This suggests that the question of what measurement scales are appropriate, 
for criteria of theory choice, does not have a simple answer. Different scales may be 
appropriate for different criteria, and may depend on the inferential techniques that we 
are using. It may be that for the ‘large scale’ theory choices that Kuhn was interested 
in, ordinal comparisons are all that can be achieved. But it seems clear that in other, 
more humdrum cases, particularly where the problem may be formulated statistically, 
we may have much more than ordinal information at our disposal.  
Finally, note that the situation for theory choice is more complicated than for 
social choice. In social choice, one normally assumes a single type of measurement 
scale for all utility functions. It would make little sense to suggest that individual 1’s 
utility function was ordinal, individual 2’s cardinal. But the analogous situation for 
theory choice makes good sense. It might well be that fruitfulness, for example, is 
merely ordinal but that fit-with-the-data is ratio-scale measurable. 
 What about inter-criterion comparisons, the analogue of interpersonal 
comparisons? One might think that such comparisons are unlikely. Take for example 
the statement: ‘the difference in simplicity between T1 and T2 exceeds the difference 
in accuracy between T3 and T4’. It is hard to see what the basis for such a judgement 
might be. It is harder still to see how comparisons of levels, rather than differences, 
could be made—this would permit statements such as ‘the accuracy of T1 is less than 
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the simplicity of T2’, which sound even odder. Since inter-criterion comparability is 
needed to avoid the impossibility result, as we know, the prospects for escaping the 
Arrovian predicament by enriching the informational basis of theory choice may seem 
dim. 
 However this is overly pessimistic, for two reasons. Firstly, note that if all 
criteria are absolutely measurable, then interpersonal comparability follows 
immediately. If the ‘utility’ functions that represent the simplicity and accuracy 
orderings cannot be transformed without loss of information, then statements such as 
‘the accuracy of T1 is less than the simplicity of T2’ automatically become 
meaningful. (Crucially, ‘meaningful’ here has a technical sense, i.e. invariance under 
the permissible transformations; it does not mean that there would be any particular 
purpose in uttering the statement in question.)F
20
F Since, as argued above, absolute 
measurability may be appropriate for some criteria of theory choice in some contexts, 
inter-criterion comparability should not be dismissed out of hand. 
 Secondly, recall the discussion of ratio-scale measurability in section 6. If the 
criteria of theory choice are each measured on their own ratio-scale (i.e. RNC), then 
this: (i) permits a limited form of inter-criterion comparability, and (ii) avoids 
Arrovian impossibility so long as all ‘utilities’ are non-negative. Ratio-scale 
measurability is fairly plausible in certain inferential contexts. Consider ‘scope’, for 
example. If differences in scope can be compared, and if in addition there is a natural 
zero point, that is, it makes sense to talk about a theory with zero scope, then scope is 
ratio-scale measurable. This does not seem altogether implausible, for some criteria in 
some inferential contexts. If both scope and accuracy (say) are ratio-scale measurable, 
each with their own scale, then this permits a limited form of inter-criterion 
comparability: percentage increases in scope may be compared with percentage 
increases in accuracy. (So statements such as ‘T1 has 10% less scope than T2, but is 
15% more accurate’ can be made.) As regards point (ii), the restriction to non-
negative ‘utilities’ seems unproblematic; if ‘scope’ has a natural zero point, why 
demand that the theory choice functional be able to deal with profiles in which some 
theories (per impossible) have negative scope? So there is a potential escape route 
from Arrow here too.  
                                                 
20 It is also important to see that inter-criterion comparability does not require that the two criteria be 
measured in the same units, for the comparison in question is a comparison of real numbers, not of the 
quantities that they represent.  
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 To sum up, Sen’s work, transposed to the theory choice case, tells us that there 
do exist theory choice functionals that satisfy Arrow’s four conditions, so long as the 
ONC condition is replaced in favour of one that permits inter-criterion comparison. 
This prompts the question of what replacement of ONC (if any) is appropriate, that is, 
which profiles of ‘utility’ functions should be treated as informationally equivalent. 
There is no simple answer to this question. However, in some cases absolute 
measurement will be appropriate, implying that ONC should be replaced with AFC; 
this permits the impossibility result to be avoided. In other cases ratio-scale 
measurement will be appropriate, which also permits the impossibility result to be 
avoided. The general moral is that enriching the informational basis of theory choice 
does permit an escape from Arrow; though which enrichments are defensible must be 
answered on a case-by-case basis. 
Where does this leave us vis-à-vis Kuhn’s ‘no algorithm’ thesis? If we can 
escape the Arrovian predicament by enlarging the informational basis, as described 
above, we will end up with many theory choice functionals that meet our 
reasonableness constraints. For replacing ONC with an alternative condition (such as 
AFC), while retaining Arrow’s four conditions, does not narrow down the class of 
permissible theory choice functionals to a single one. So we escape Arrow’s 
predicament only to enter Kuhn’s: many acceptable algorithms, and no way to select 
between them. To escape both predicaments, we need reasonableness conditions that 
are satisfied by exactly one algorithm. In the social choice literature, researchers have 
managed to identify conditions that uniquely pick out particular social welfare 
functionals, such as the utilitarian SWFL, Rawlsian maximin, and others; but it is 
doubtful whether the analogues of these conditions, transposed to the theory choice 
case, would be defensible. (By contrast, the analogues of Arrow’s conditions are 
certainly defensible.) Therefore in the theory choice case, escaping Arrovian 
impossibility by enriching the informational basis seems to lead us straight to Kuhn’s 
‘no algorithm’ thesis. 
 
8. Illustrations: Bayesianism and statistical model selection 
The previous section’s main conclusion—that Sen’s escape route from Arrow does 
apply to theory choice—can be illustrated by considering the orthodox Bayesian 
approach to scientific inference. Suppose we have a body of evidence E, and five rival 
hypotheses {T1,  , T5} that are pair-wise exclusive. On the Bayesian view, we use 
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two criteria to choose between the hypotheses: prior probability P(Ti), and likelihood, 
P(E/Ti). (Likelihood can be thought of as a measure of the ‘fit’ between evidence and 
hypothesis, prior probability a measure of the antecedent plausibility of a hypothesis, 
before the evidence.) Clearly, there are many possible ways of combining these two 
criteria into a decision rule; but Bayesians argue that the right way to do it is to 
multiply the prior by the likelihood, that is, to consider the quantity [P(Ti) x P(E/Ti)]. 
The theory with the highest value of this quantity is the most deserving of our 
credence, according to Bayesians; and more generally, this quantity can be used to 
generate an overall ranking of the theories, from best to worst. 
 Bayesians have some sophisticated arguments for why this is the right way to 
combine the two criteria, but they need not detain us. For the moment, we want to 
relate Bayesianism to our foregoing discussion. To do this, simply think of P(Ti) and 
P(E/Ti) as ‘utility’ functions, both of which assign a real number to each of the five 
theories. The ordered pair < P(Ti), P(E/Ti)> is then a profile, corresponding to a 
profile of utility functions in a two-person society, in Sen’s framework. Now consider 
the function which maps the set of profiles onto the ranking generated by the quantity 
[P(Ti) x P(E/Ti)]. This corresponds to a social welfare functional in Sen’s framework, 
or what we called a ‘theory choice functional’ in section 7. The functional takes as 
input the prior probability and likelihood of each theory, and yields as output a 
ranking of the theories, from best to worst. Let us call this the ‘Bayesian theory choice 
functional’, or BCF. 
 Now let us ask: does the BCF satisfy the four Arrovian conditions? Consider 
firstly condition P′, weak Pareto. It easy to see that P′ is satisfied: if theory T1 has a 
higher prior and a higher likelihood than theory T2, that is, P(T1) > P(T2) and P(E/T1) 
> P(E/T2), then T1 will obviously be ranked higher than T2 by the BCF. Condition I′, 
the independence of irrelevant ‘utilities’ condition, is also satisfied: whether T1 or T2 
is ranked higher by the BCF is entirely determined by the priors and likelihoods of 
those two theories; no other information is relevant. Finally, condition N′, non-
dictatorship, is also satisfied. Neither criterion (prior or likelihood) is able to dictate 
over the other—it is not true that if T1 has a higher prior than T2 then it must be 
ranked higher, and similarly for likelihood. 
 What about condition U′, unrestricted domain? This says that the domain of 
the theory choice functional must be the set of all possible profiles, that is, pairs of 
real-valued functions. Clearly the BCF does not satisfy this condition, for both of the 
 25 
functions that we feed into it, P(Ti) and P(E/Ti), can only take on values in the unit 
interval [0,1]; moreover, it is required that ∑P(Ti) ≤ 1. Thus there are two restrictions 
on the permissible values of the functions we feed into the Bayesian theory choice 
functional. So condition U′ is not satisfied, whereas conditions P′, I′ and N′ are. 
 Mindful of Arrow’s theorem, one might think that it is because the BCF has a 
restricted domain, so violates condition U′, that it can satisfy P′, I′ and N′. But this is 
not correct. Recall that within Sen’s framework, the derivation of Arrow’s result 
requires the ONC condition, in addition to conditions U′, P′, I′ and N′. The ONC 
condition says that any two profiles are informationally equivalent, hence should be 
mapped to the same ranking, if one is derivable from the other by applying increasing 
transformations to the functions in the profile. But the BCF does not satisfy this 
condition; on the contrary, it is quite possible to have two profiles < P(Ti), P(E/Ti)> 
and < Q(Ti), Q(E/Ti)>, where the two prior functions P(Ti) and Q(Ti) rank the theories 
identically, and the two likelihood functions P(E/Ti) and Q(E/Ti) also rank them 
identically, and yet the overall rankings, generated by the BCF, are different in the 
two cases. 
  This prompts the question: which measurability/comparability assumption is 
appropriate for the Bayesian theory choice functional? Since probabilities are 
measured on an absolute scale, the answer is clear: absolute full comparability (AFC). 
Given a profile < P(Ti), P(E/Ti)>, applying any transformation to it other than the 
identity transformation will alter its informational content—for the actual probability 
numbers are meaningful.F
21
F So the prior probability function contains much more than 
the merely ordinal information that gives rise to Arrovian impossibility; the same is 
true of the likelihood function. 
 Therefore, the Bayesian theory choice functional violates two of the 
conditions that are required to generate Arrow’s impossibility result in Sen’s 
framework—U′ and ONC. The fact that the BCF has a restricted domain is not 
crucial—what matters is the fact that it uses more than ordinal non-comparable 
information. For even with the domain restriction appropriate to the BCF, if the ONC 
condition were imposed, then the P′, I′ and N′ conditions would be jointly 
unsatisfiable (see Appendix for proof.) The fact that the BCF satisfies the latter three 
                                                 
21 Probabilities are measured on an absolute scale modulo the convention that the sure event has 
probability 1. If this convention were relaxed, i.e. if we chose some other positive number for the 
probability of the sure event, then probability would become ratio-scale measurable. 
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conditions is therefore attributable to the richness of the information fed into it, rather 
than to its restricted domain. 
 This illustrates how Sen’s escape route from Arrow does apply to theory 
choice. The Bayesian theory choice functional constitutes a kind of algorithm for 
theory choice, and does satisfy the Arrovian conditions (other than U′); this is 
possible because the appropriate measurability/comparability assumption is AFC, 
rather than ONC. The BCF is by no means the only theory choice functional that 
satisfies AFC and the Arrovian conditions; so there is potential for a Kuhnian ‘no 
unique algorithm’ argument. However, such an argument would have to counter the 
Bayesians’ argument for why their theory choice functional is the ‘correct’ one. This 
important issue cannot be addressed here. My aim has only been to illustrate how in 
theory choice, enriching the informational basis permits an escape from Arrovian 
impossibility, just as it does in social choice. 
 A second illustration of this point is provided by a quite different approach to 
scientific inference, namely statistical model selection. This approach is a 
sophisticated variant of what philosophers call the ‘curve fitting’ problem, or inferring 
the functional relation between two variables from finite data. However, unlike in 
more simplified discussions of curve-fitting, it is assumed that the data are ‘noisy’, 
that is, the data points are affected by measurement error. The aim is to choose 
between alternative hypotheses about the functional relation between two variables x 
and y, from the noisy data. Two criteria are used: simplicity and fit-with-the-data. The 
two will often exhibit a trade-off: improving fit means sacrificing simplicity. Clearly, 
we have here the ingredients for a Kuhnian ‘no unique algorithm’ claim – there are 
many conceivable ways of combining fit and simplicity into a single decision rule. 
In a typical model selection problem, we start with a number of families of 
hypotheses. For example, one family consists of all hypotheses of the form y = a + bx, 
a, b  ; let us call this family LIN. Another family, PAR, consists of all hypotheses 
of the form y = a + bx + cx
2
; and a third, EXP, consists of all hypotheses of the form y 
= a
x
. The real numbers a, b and c are called free parameters; and the simplicity of a 
hypothesis is defined as the number of free parameters in its family. Thus each 
hypothesis in LIN is simpler than each in PAR. Next, one finds the best-fitting 
hypothesis in each family, denoted L(LIN), L(PAR) and L(EXP) respectively; the 
criterion of best-fit is highest likelihood, where ‘likelihood’ has its customary 
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statistical meaning (roughly, the probability of observing the actual data, if the 
hypothesis were true.) 
 In the statistical literature, there exist various suggestions for how to combine 
simplicity and fit into a decision rule (Forster 2001); such a rule would allow us to 
choose between the three hypotheses L(LIN), L(PAR) and L(EXP), in the above 
example. One of the best-known is the Akaike criterion, which says that that we 
should choose the hypothesis with the highest Akaike score; the Akaike score of a 
hypothesis H is defined as [log-likelihood H − k], where k is the number of free 
parameters of the family to which the hypothesis belongs. Therefore, the better a 
hypothesis fits the data the higher its Akaike score; however, there is a penalty for 
complexity, that is, for having lots of free parameters. Thus Akaike’s criterion 
combines simplicity and fit-with-the-data into a single algorithm for hypothesis 
choice, which ranks the hypotheses from best to worst. Obviously, there are many 
other conceivable algorithms, but there exist sophisticated arguments for why 
Akaike’s is the ‘correct’ one. 
 To relate statistical model selection to social choice, think of log-likelihood Hi 
and ki as ‘utility functions’, each of which assigns a number to each hypothesis 
reflecting, respectively, its fit and its simplicity. Then consider the set of all ordered 
pairs (profiles) of the form <log-likelihood Hi, ki>—these are all the possible 
combinations of fit with simplicity. Then consider the function from this set to the 
ranking of hypotheses generated by the Akaike score. Formally, this function 
corresponds to the social choice functional of section 6 and the theory choice 
functional of section 7. Let us call it the ‘Akaike choice functional’. 
 Now we can ask: does the Akaike choice functional satisfy the Arrovian 
conditions? It is easy to see that conditions P′, I′ and N′ are all satisfied, by an 
argument parallel to the one given above for the Bayesian choice functional. But 
condition U′ (unrestricted domain) is not satisfied—for the log-likelihood function 
only takes negative values and the free parameter function only takes positive integer 
values, which implies a domain restriction. What about the ONC (ordinal non-
comparability) assumption? This is not satisfied either. It is not the case that if one 
profile can be got from another by applying increasing transformations to the two 
‘utility’ functions, that the Akaike choice functional will necessarily map them to the 
same ranking. Again, the appropriate assumption, in lieu of ONC, is absolute full 
comparability (AFC); since the actual numbers assigned by the two functions are 
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meaningful, any transformations will change their informational content. As with the 
Bayesian choice functional, it is because the Akaike choice functional does not satisfy 
ONC, rather than because of its restricted domain, that it is able to satisfy conditions 
P′, I′ and N′.F22F  
Again, the point of this is not to defend the Akaike criterion in particular, but 
rather to illustrate how Sen’s moral—that enriching the informational basis can avoid 
Arrovian impossibility—applies to theory choice. The information we feed as input 
into the Akaike choice functional is far more than merely ordinal, which explains why 
it satisfies the Arrovian conditions (other than U′). Of course there are many 
alternative functionals, besides Akaike’s, that will also satisfy those conditions, so 
again, escaping the Arrovian predicament may land us in the Kuhnian one. However, 
there are also arguments for why the Akaike criterion is the uniquely ‘correct’ one; so 
it may be that both predicaments can be avoided. A proper assessment of this issue 
cannot be undertaken here. 
 
9. Conclusion 
Although Kuhn’s ‘no algorithm’ thesis is quite widely accepted in philosophy of 
science, there have been few attempts to subject it to serious scrutiny. To remedy this 
situation, I have used the machinery of social choice theory, and tried to relate Kuhn’s 
thesis to Arrow’s famous impossibility theorem. Though superficially similar to 
Kuhn’s, Arrow’s conclusion that there is ‘no algorithm’ for social choice is in fact 
quite different. For Kuhn’s claim is that there are many algorithms, all equally 
acceptable, while Arrow’s claim is that no algorithms meet minimum standards of 
acceptability. 
 By identifying Kuhn’s five criteria with Arrow’s individuals, the theory choice 
problem was seen to have the same structure as a standard social choice problem. 
Moreover, Arrow’s four conditions seem as defensible for theory choice as they are 
for social choice, which raises the spectre of an Arrovian impossibility result for 
theory choice. Such a result would constitute a refutation of Kuhn’s thesis, but would 
also pose a threat for the rationality of science; a threat that if anything is more 
worrying than that posed by Kuhn.  
                                                 
22 An argument parallel to the one given in the Appendix shows that with the domain restriction 
appropriate to the Akaike choice functional, conditions P′, I′ and N′ are jointly unsatisfiable if ONC is 
assumed. Thus it is the violation of ONC, not the domain restriction, that permits the satisfaction of 
conditions P′, I′ and N′. 
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A number of possible ‘ways out’ of the impossibility, while remaining within 
Arrow’s framework, were canvassed; these included confining attention to binary 
theory choices and accepting a serial dictatorship of ‘accuracy’. More promising was 
Sen’s idea of moving to a different framework by enriching the informational basis, 
that is, going beyond the ordinal, non-comparable information that Arrow starts with. 
Applying Sen’s idea to theory choice raised difficult questions about the appropriate 
measurability/comparability assumptions; however, we showed by example that two 
well-known approaches to theory choice, Bayesianism and statistical model selection, 
avoid Arrovian impossibility precisely by incorporating more than ordinal, non-
comparable information. 
 Finally, what then of Kuhn’s ‘no algorithm’ thesis? Is it correct? No simple 
answer to this question emerges from the foregoing analysis. It may be that we can 
avoid Arrovian impossibility only by opening the door to many different algorithms, 
thus vindicating Kuhn; but we should not rule out the possibility of finding additional 
rationality constraints which considerably narrow down the acceptable ones, possibly 
even to uniqueness. Although my analysis does not provide a definitive resolution, I 
hope to have identified the sorts of consideration that are relevant to determining 
whether Kuhn’s thesis is correct.F23 
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Appendix 
Consider a finite set X of pair-wise exclusive theories {T1,  , Tn}. We assume X is a 
partition of logical space.F
24
F Let Y be the set of all orderings of X. 
There are two ‘individuals’, each with a real-valued ‘utility’ function over X, denoted 
u1 and u2 respectively. A profile (ordered pair) of utility functions, one for each 
individual, is denoted <u1, u2>.  
Let D be the set of all possible profiles.  
Let R  D be the set of all profiles satisfying the condition: for all individuals i, and 
all x  X, 0 ≤ ui(x) ≤ 1, i.e. both utility functions can only take values in [0,1]. 
Let T  R be the set of all profiles satisfying the additional condition: ∑ u1(Ti) = 1, 
i.e. the utilities that individual 1 assigns to the theories sum to 1. 
So we have T  R  D (see diagram). 
 
D 










By Arrow’s theorem (in Sen’s framework), there exists no function f: D→Y 
satisfying the conditions P′, I′, N′ and ONC. 
We wish to show that there is no function f: T→Y satisfying the conditions P′, I′, N′ 
and ONC. 
We show firstly that there is no function g: R→Y satisfying the conditions P′, I′, N′ 
and ONC. 
 
                                                 
24 Taking X to be a partition makes the second half of the proof easier, as it allows us to assume that ∑ 
u1(Ti) = 1 as opposed to merely ∑ u1(Ti) ≤ 1, but could easily be relaxed. 
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1. Suppose for reductio that there exists a function g: R→Y satisfying conditions P′, 
I′, N′ and ONC.  
Let S  R be the set of all profiles satisfying the condition: for all individuals i, and 
all x  X, 0  ui(x)  1. 
Since g satisfies P′, I′, N′ and ONC, and since g has domain R and S  R, then there 
exists a function g: S→Y satisfying the conditions P′, I′, N′ and ONC.  
Let t: →(0,1) be any increasing function mapping the real number line onto the 
open unit interval, e.g. t(x) = [x-2]
-1
 if x< 0, t(x) = [x+1]/[x+2] if x ≥0. 
Let h be the result of applying the transformation ui(x) → t[ui(x)] to each individual’s 
utility function in each profile <u1, u2> in D. Therefore h: D → S maps each profile in 
D onto a profile in S. 
The function g  h (‘g after h’) then has domain D and range Y. 
Since g satisfies conditions P′, I′, N′ and ONC, and since t is increasing, it follows 
that g  h satisfies conditions P′, I′, N′ and ONC too. But by Arrow’s theorem no 
function with domain D satisfies these conditions.  
Therefore there is no function g: R→Y satisfying conditions P′, I′, N′ and ONC. 
 
2. Suppose for reductio that there exists a function f: T→Y satisfying the conditions 
P′, I′, N′ and ONC. 
Let r: [0,1] →[0,1] be a function mapping individual 1’s utility function u1(Ti) onto 
[u1(Ti) / [(u1(T1) + u1(T2) +,  , + u1(Tn)]]. (Applying r to individual 1’s utility 
function has the effect of normalizing it, to ensure that ∑ u1(Ti) = 1.) 
Let h be the result of applying the transformation <u1, u2> → <r(u1), u2>  to each 
profile in R. Therefore h: R→T maps each profile in R onto a profile in T. 
The function f  h (‘f after h’) then has domain R and range Y. 
Since f satisfies conditions P′, N′ and ONC, and since r is increasing, it follows that 
f  h satisfies conditions P′, N′ and ONC too. 
 
To show that f  h satisfies condition I′, consider two profiles <u1, u2> and <v1, v2> 
in R that coincide over the theories T1 and T2, i.e. u1(T1) = v1(T1), u2(T1) = v2(T1) and 
u1(T2) = v1(T2), u2(T2) = v2(T2). 
[Note: it does not follow that <r(u1), u2>  and <r(v1), v2> must also coincide over T1 
and T2.] 
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Choose any profile <r(u1), u2> in T such that:  
(i) r(u1) and r(u1) order the theories in the same way; and  
(ii) r(u1)(T1) = r(v1)(T1), and r(u1)(T2) = r(v1)(T2) 
(There must be such a profile, since r(u1) and r(v1) order T1 and T2 in the same way; 
for all other theories Ti, choose r(u1)(Ti) so as to produce the same order as r(u1).) 
Now, the profiles <r(u1), u2> and <r(v1), v2> coincide over T1 and T2, so f must map 
them onto orderings of the set X in which T1 and T2 are ranked identically, by 
condition I'. 
Since r(u1) and r(u1) order the theories in the same way, f must map <r(u1), u2> and 
<r(u1), u2> onto the same ordering of the set X, by condition ONC. 
Therefore, f must map <r(u1), u2> and <r(v1), v2> onto orderings of the set X in 
which T1 and T2 are ranked identically.  
Therefore, f  h maps <u1, u2> and <v1, v2> onto orderings of the set X in which T1 
and T2 are ranked identically, i.e. f  h satisfies condition I′. 
 
So f  h has domain R and satisfies conditions P′, I', N' and ONC. However, by part 
1 above, no function with domain R satisfies those conditions. 
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